Segregated Witness (SegWit) has activated on Bitcoin. As of today, all SegWit-ready nodes on the Bitcoin network are enforcing the new rules, marking Bitcoin’s biggest protocol upgrade to date.
But activation did not come easy, and it did not come fast.
This is a look back at the long road to SegWit.
The Problem
Bitcoin transactions consist of two main parts. One part is “base transaction data.” That covers which bitcoins are being moved and where they are being moved to, as well as some other data. The second part is called the “witness.” This contains a bit of code with cryptographic signature data, which proves that the owner of a bitcoin really did want to spend the bitcoin.
It’s this signature data that brings a slight complication with it. In what is referred to as the “malleability bug,” Bitcoin signatures can be slightly altered by anyone, even after these signatures are created and without invalidating the signatures. This in turn means that the appearance of the whole transaction, and more specifically the transaction identifier, can be altered by those relaying transactions over the Bitcoin network or by miners that include transactions in blocks.
Statistics from the 2015 malleability attack on Bitcoin. The red lines roughly represent malleated transactions on the network
This doesn’t need to be a big problem in itself. Transactions are still valid and will move the bitcoins from the same place to the same place, under all the same conditions. However, it does complicate creating newer transactions depending on unconfirmed transactions: New transactions need to know the transaction identifier they rely on. This, in turn, makes it significantly harder to build certain second-layer protocols on top of Bitcoin, like bi-directional payment channels.
The Idea
The general idea to solve the malleability bug by “separating” signature data from other transaction data stems back several years.
As far back as 2012, the likes of Bitcoin Core contributors Russell O’Connor, Matt Corallo, Luke Dashjr and Gregory Maxwell, as well as Bitcointalk moderator “Theymos,” discussed the issue on IRC Bitcoin development channels — but at that time they didn’t see a tenable way of pulling it off on the Bitcoin network.
Russell O’Connor, Gregory Maxwell, Luke Dashjr and Theymos discuss the malleability bug on IRC back in 2012
A year later, in August 2013, the issue resurfaced, as Bitcoin Core contributors Peter Todd and Gregory Maxwell were having similar discussions on IRC. But now, the two were making progress with their ideas to counter malleability. “I’m talking about making the [entirety] of the scriptsig largely [separate],” Maxwell wrote. “I’d even suggest using as [transaction ID] the transaction without the scriptsigs.”
Another month later, Maxwell and, this time, well-known cryptographer Dr. Adam Back were discussing the malleability issue on IRC once again. Now, Back suggested computing the transaction ID by omitting the signature. Though, Maxwell commented, “getting the sig out of the txid could help but that would be a very deep hardforking change … and it’s actually tricky to make secure.”
The Sidechain
Blockstream’s initial proposal for sidechain extensions for Bitcoin’s blockchain
In August 2014, blockchain technology company Blockstream was founded by the same Adam Back and Gregory Maxwell, as well as entrepreneur and investor Austin Hill and several Bitcoin Core developers, including Dr. Pieter Wuille. The company was set to focus on sidechains: alternative blockchains that can effectively be pegged to Bitcoin.
By early 2015, Blockstream engineers decided to implement a new feature in the company’s prototype sidechain Elements, which was publicly announced in June of that year. This feature would conclusively solve the malleability issue on the sidechain — by separating base transaction data from witness data into different data structures.
The name of this new feature was, of course, Segregated Witness.
The Block Size Dispute
It had been looming for some time, technically since October 2010, more concretely since February 2013and finally publicly, bursting onto the scene by the spring of 2015: the block size limit dispute.
Former Bitcoin Core lead developer Gavin Andresen and Bitcoinj lead developer Mike Hearn, in particular, believed that Bitcoin’s 1 megabyte block size limit should be increased with a hard fork, an incompatible protocol change that would require almost the entire Bitcoin ecosystem to upgrade. No easy task — even more so because there was no community-wide consensus for this change.
Regardless, by the summer of 2015, Andresen and Hearn announced that they would move forward with their plans, using the alternative Bitcoin XT software client. The controversial nature of the effort put the Bitcoin development community and industry in somewhat of a state of emergency.
In an attempt to resolve the divide and potentially help figure out a resolution to the block size dispute, two conferences (or workshops) were quickly organized in the latter half of 2015: Scaling Bitcoin Montreal andScaling Bitcoin Hong Kong.
One of the most promising scaling proposals presented in Montreal was the lightning network, a sophisticated second-layer scaling solution that was detailed in a white paper published by Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja only months earlier. The only problem: this solution would require a malleability fix.
The Soft Fork
Eric Lombrozo (CodeShark), Wladimir van der Laan (wumpus), Luke Dashjr (luke-jr) and Dr. Pieter Wuille (sipa) discuss SegWit as a soft fork on IRC
At this point in time, developers were still not sure if and how the malleability bug could be fixed. Most still thought Segregated Witness could not be implemented on Bitcoin’s main chain without a hard fork.
But not Bitcoin Core contributor (and Bitcoin Knots maintainer) Luke Dashjr.
In October 2015, right between the two Scaling Bitcoin conferences, Bitcoin Core contributors Eric Lombrozo, Pieter Wuille, Wladimir van der Laan and Luke Dashjr discussed a potential new model for soft forks on IRC. During this chat, Dashjr pointed out that the proposed mechanism wouldn’t work for all potential soft forks, like a SegWit soft fork.
Interestingly, what Dashjr considered obvious — the option to deploy SegWit as a soft fork — had not even been considered by others at all. And even Dashjr didn’t seem to realize the implications of this possibility at first.
To deploy SegWit as a soft fork, witness data had to be placed in a new part of a Bitcoin block. And the “anchor” for all of this witness data (the “Merkle root”) had to be moved to a somewhat unconventional part of a Bitcoin block: the coinbase transaction that rewards miners new coins.
While unconventional, the Bitcoin Core contributors would, over the days and weeks that followed, also come to realize that this method opened up an interesting “bonus.” By creating a new part of a Bitcoin block for the witness data, Bitcoin’s block size could be increased in such a way that non-upgraded nodes wouldn’t notice. This could actually increase Bitcoin’s block size without increasing Bitcoin’s existing block size limit.
Mere weeks before the second Scaling Bitcoin workshop, several Bitcoin Core contributors thought they may finally have found at least a temporary solution for the block size limit dispute. Segregated Witness would effectively increase the limit in a backward-compatible manner, while at the same time fixing the long-standing malleability bug, thereby enabling more advanced scaling solutions like the lightning network.
A win-win-win solution — or so they thought.
The Presentation
Segregated Witness — as a soft fork — was first presented by Pieter Wuille in December 2015, at the second edition of the Scaling Bitcoin workshops in Hong Kong. Many first heard about the proposal there, and it initially seemed to be welcomed with enthusiasm.
Shortly after this second edition of Scaling Bitcoin had ended, Gregory Maxwell proposed what has become known as the scaling roadmap, which featured SegWit as a centerpiece. This roadmap was quicklyendorsed by the Bitcoin Core development team, as well as other developers and users in the broader Bitcoin ecosystem.
The Critique
But despite initial excitement, Segregated Witness had its critics, too.
Concerns about the proposed protocol upgrade varied. Jeff Garzik, the former Bitcoin Core contributor — who would soon after found his own development company Bloq — did not consider SegWit a sufficient short-term scaling solution. Bitcoin XT lead developer Mike Hearn, meanwhile, was not convinced by the proposal at all: He dismissed the solution as an “accounting trick” and completely quit Bitcoin development shortly after.
Jonathan Toomim, developer for alternative software client Bitcoin Classic, argued that the proposal was “ugly and awkward,” suggesting it would be better implemented as a hard fork. Even Bitcoin Core contributor Peter Todd had his concerns, in particular related to mining.
Most of these issues were deemed either solvable, unconvincing or worth the trade-off by the Bitcoin Core development team at large, however. Development of the soft-fork upgrade commenced.
The Development
Even though a version of Segregated Witness was already implemented on Elements, the code for the Bitcoin main chain version mostly had yet to be written, not only because it needed to be implemented as a soft fork, but also because SegWit for Bitcoin would enjoy a range of new features not present in Elements: for example, the “witness discount” necessary to increase the block size, new compatibility for the peer-to-peer network and more.
The concrete Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for SegWit, BIP141, was authored by Pieter Wuille, Ciphrex CEO Eric Lombrozo and independent Bitcoin Core contributor Dr. Johnson Lau. By early January 2016, in the midst of a heated scaling debate, these and other Bitcoin Core contributors launched an initial dedicated test network for the protocol upgrade, which was dubbed SegNet. Another two weeks later, this testnet was taken public for the wider Bitcoin development community to experiment with. And by March, SegNet was upgraded to support test versions of the lightning network.
Development continued for the months to come, taking in feedback from Bitcoin’s development community, fixing bugs, improving the codebase accordingly and launching several more iterations of SegNet(s).
The SegWit GitHub page, where development and other issues are publicly visible for anyone to keep track of and contribute to
Meanwhile, Bitcoin Core contributors also reached out to the broader Bitcoin industry, which over time led to a consistently growing list of companies and projects committing to supporting Segregated Witness.
By June, the Segregated Witness code counted 4,743 lines of code (including test code) and proposed removing or modifying 554 existing lines of Bitcoin Core code. After more review from several contributors, Bitcoin Core lead maintainer, Wladimir van der Laan, merged it into Bitcoin Core’s “master branch” by the end of that month.
The Meetings
At the same time that SegWit was being developed, block size tensions in the Bitcoin community were once again heating up. This time spearheaded by Bitcoin Classic, a number of Bitcoin companies and miners appeared determined to hard fork in order to increase the block size limit to 2 megabytes.
In what is perhaps best described as an emergency meeting, once again in Hong Kong, several Bitcoin Core contributors, mining pool operators and other Bitcoin industry members met to discuss the scaling issue.
The meeting led to an agreement that came to be known as the “Bitcoin Roundtable Consensus” (or the “Hong Kong Agreement”). The Bitcoin Core contributors present at the meeting agreed to work on a block size limit increase hard fork to be proposed to the Bitcoin Core development team and the wider Bitcoin community. The miners, in turn, agreed to run a SegWit release in production by the time such a hard fork would be released in a version of Bitcoin Core. The crisis seemed to have been averted — even though it quickly became clear that not everyone was happy about the agreement.
Several months later, an even bigger group of Bitcoin Core contributors and mining pool operators met in California. The Bitcoin Core contributors present at this meeting left convinced that Segregated Witness would be activated by the miners.
The Release
About six months behind on the initial schedule — the release was originally set for April — Segregated Witness was officially introduced October of 2016, in Bitcoin Core version 0.13.1. The protocol upgrade was also implemented in several other Bitcoin implementations, like Bitcoin Knots and Bcoin.
Using an activation method called “VersionBits” (BIP9), designed to minimize network disruption, 95 percent of miners (by hash power) had to signal support for SegWit to activate on the Bitcoin network. This miner signaling was to start on November 15th. Meanwhile, users were encouraged to upgrade their clients, which over time, it seemed, many did.
As of August 2017, the vast majority of the Bitcoin network consists of SegWit-ready nodes (source: luke.dashjr.org)
Based on the meetings with mining pool operators, as well as a general conviction that SegWit would be a boon for Bitcoin, many expected that the soft fork would be activated rather quickly.
The Politics
But that’s not what happened. As it turned out, several attendees of the Hong Kong Roundtable Consensus disagreed over what they had actually signed onto.
Bitmain co-CEO Jihan Wu, in particular, indicated he would only be willing to activate SegWit if the Bitcoin Core development team also implemented a hard fork to increase the block size limit in their codebase. Other mining pools, including F2Pool, HaoBTC and bitcoin.com didn’t signal support for the soft fork either.
Bitmain (and subsidiary AntPool) demand a hard fork block size limit increase in return for SegWit activation.
Moreover, a new Chinese mining pool emerged: ViaBTC. With close ties to Bitmain, ViaBTC alone garnered enough hash power to single-handedly block SegWit activation. And its operator, Haipo Yang, positioned himself as a staunch critic of the proposed protocol upgrade.
SegWit activation seemed far away.
The UASF
The avatar of pseudonymous Bitcoin and Litecoin developer Shaolinfry
In February 2017, a little over three months after the official release of SegWit, a new opportunity presented itself.
The pseudonymous developer “Shaolinfry,” who had previously contributed to Litecoin, dropped a new proposal in the Bitcoin development mailing list and the popular bitcointalk.org forum: a “user activated soft fork” or “UASF.”
Shaolinfry argued in his email that the hash power activation mechanism that had become the standard for soft forks was never intended to be a “vote.” “[T]he signaling methodology is widely misinterpreted to mean the hash power is voting on a proposal and it seems difficult to correct this misunderstanding in the wider community,” he wrote.
Shaolinfry proposed an alternative: a user activated soft fork (UASF). Instead of hash power activation, a user activated soft fork would have a “‘flag day activation’ where nodes begin enforcement at a predetermined time in the future.” As long as such a UASF is enforced by an economic majority, this should compel a majority of miners to follow (or activate) the soft fork.
The idea immediately generated buzz throughout Bitcoin forums and social media. And when former BTCC COO and outspoken SegWit proponent Samson Mow set up a bounty fund for the development of a UASF software implementation, it seemed like the proposal could become a reality.
The Patented Technology
In the first week of April 2017, Gregory Maxwell dropped what was widely considered a bombshell revelation on the Bitcoin development mailing list.
Maxwell claimed to have reverse-engineered a specialized ASIC-mining chip and found that it included patented AsicBoost technology. What’s more, Maxwell revealed that covert use of the technology would be incompatible with a soft-forked version of SegWit. “An incompatibility would go a long way to explain some of the more inexplicable behavior from some parties in the mining ecosystem,” he noted.
While no specific ASIC-manufacturer was mentioned in Maxwell’s email, Bitmain acknowledged that it had implemented the patented technology in their mining chips — though it denied having used it on Bitcoin’s mainnet.
Either way, for some users the revelation added to the desire to have the Segregated Witness soft fork activated on the Bitcoin network. And, as hash power activation seemed even less likely now, a user activated soft fork was increasingly looking like the solution to accomplish that.
The BIP148 Proposal
Shortly after proposing the general idea of a UASF, Shaolinfry and about a dozen other members of the Bitcoin community opened a UASF channel on the Bitcoin Core Community Slack.
The channel became a central point of discussion and organization for the initiative. A flag date was picked, initially for October 1, then later moved to August 1 to better account for potentially low hash power support. Shaolinfry authored a concrete Bitcoin Improvement Proposal: BIP148. Open Dime founder Rodolfo Novak also established an informational website to promote the idea.
The initial plan was to get exchanges and other businesses on board with the UASF. If these companies would support the proposal and enforce the soft fork, it would go a long way in realizing a desired economic majority.
But the UASF did not gain the level of traction some of its proponents hoped for. While a number of companies and some developers seemed onboard with BIP148, no major exchanges or other businesses declared support and some even spoke out against the initiative.
And, by mid-April, Gregory Maxwell on the Bitcoin development mailing list stated that he believed BIP148 to be a bad idea as well. Coming from one of the most respected and influential Bitcoin Core contributors, his rejection of the initiative had an impact: This version of a UASF appeared to be losing all momentum.
Instead, some began to work on an alternative UASF: BIP149.
The Altcoins
Many altcoins are based on Bitcoin’s codebase. This means that the SegWit code, while developed for Bitcoin, is largely compatible with these alternative cryptocurrencies. Unsurprisingly, therefore, several altcoins decided to implement SegWit. The first to activate Segregated Witness was Groestlcoin as early as January 2017.
But other coins were struggling. Litecoin, Vertcoin and Viacoin all seemed to have been caught in Bitcoin’s political game. These coins relied on the same miners as Bitcoin, to a large extent, and most were not signaling support for the upgrade.
This was allegedly due to technical issues or other stated reasons, but, as Viacoin lead developer Romano noted, “It seems more likely they want to refrain from activating Segregated Witness on altcoins because that would give them even less reason to hold off activation on Bitcoin.”
By April of 2017, this attitude led Litecoin creator Charlie Lee to advocate for a user activated soft fork on “his” coin. His initiative was eagerly picked up among Litecoin users; it didn’t take long for Litecoin miners, Lee, and other members of the Litecoin ecosystem to arrange an online meeting, the result of which was the Litecoin Global Roundtable Resolution. In exchange for some commitments by Lee, miners agreed to activate SegWit. ShaolinFry and others considered the UASF effort a success.
Within a week after SegWit activation on Litecoin, an unknown person made a bold move. He (or she) sent $1 million worth of the cryptocurrency to a SegWit-protected address, challenging anyone to steal the funds if they could. To this date, the bounty remains untouched, further strengthening confidence in the technology.
The New York Agreement
Meanwhile, the block size debate raged on. Another software client to increase Bitcoin’s block size limit per hard fork, Bitcoin Unlimited gained traction among Bitcoin’s mining community. Endorsed by Bitmain’s Wu in particular, the project appeared to be heading toward a potential (and controversial) hard fork.
This looming threat, and the possibility of a “split” in Bitcoin’s blockchain, was reason for DCG founder and CEO Barry Silbert to organize a meeting ahead of the Consensus 2017 conference in New York. Initially announced on a private email list for Bitcoin entrepreneurs and other prominent industry members, the meeting would bring together a significant chunk of the Bitcoin industry, including miners — though, notably, no Bitcoin Core contributors.
The outcome of that meeting is typically referred to as the “New York Agreement.” Participants agreed on what they deemed to be a compromise between those who wanted to increase Bitcoin’s block size with a hard fork and those who preferred SegWit. Based on an idea originally proposed by RSK founder Sergio Demian Lerner, SegWit would be activated under specific conditions, while there would also be a hard fork to double Bitcoin’s “base block size limit.”
The New York Agreement and its two concrete points of action
But while it sufficed to say not everyone in the Bitcoin ecosystem supported the agreement, one specific problem stood out in particular. The conditions for SegWit activation were largely incompatible with those proposed by the Bitcoin Core development team, for which the code was already widely adopted by Bitcoin users.
The Intolerant Minority
Imagery by Samson Mow in support of the BIP148 UASF
While the BIP148 UASF seemed to have lost a lot of steam in favor of BIP149, not everyone had given up on this first UASF proposal completely.
Shaolinfry had proposed the concept under the assumption that it would be backed by an economic majority and thought it should be aborted before the flag day otherwise. But a group of users on the UASF Slack channel had a different idea. Some of them — including Bitcoin Core and Bitcoin Knots developer Luke Dashjr — were contemplating activating the soft fork regardless of what the rest of the Bitcoin ecosystem would do. Even if they were a minority, and even if they’d effectively spin themselves off into a new altcoin, they would move forward with the upgrade.
Around mid-May, Alphonse Pace linked this determination to a game-theoretical concept described by statistician and author Nassim Nicholas Taleb: the “intolerant minority.” In short, this idea presupposes that even an economic minority should be able to compel miners to activate the Segregated Witness soft fork. They would unnecessarily lose a chunk of their “customer base” (Bitcoin users) otherwise.
Seemingly fuelled by the AsicBoost scandal, the SegWit activation on Litecoin and discontent regarding the New York Agreement — and this time backed by game theory — BIP148 support started to snowball into somewhat of a viral phenomenon on social media and message boards once again.
Several more articles discussed the growing potential of the UASF and much debate on social media, YouTube channels other discussion platforms followed. Meanwhile, Eric Lombrozo also threw his weight behind the effort, and UASF hats distributed by Samson Mow became the rage. Inspired by the codename for an upcoming Electrum Wallet release, August 1 was dubbed “Bitcoin Independence Day.”
The only problem: activation methods for BIP148 and the New York Agreement were as incompatible as the New York Agreement was with the activation methods proposed by the Bitcoin Core development team.
The Kludge
It was Bitmain Warranty engineer James Hilliard who came to the rescue. Hilliard proposed a slightly complex but clever solution that would make everything compatible: Segregated Witness activation as proposed by the Bitcoin Core development team, the BIP148 UASF and the New York Agreement activation mechanism. His BIP91 could keep Bitcoin whole — at least throughout SegWit activation.
As long as a majority of miners would activate BIP91 before August 1, all Bitcoin nodes should remain part of the same network. It was a relatively small time window, since the solution was only proposed by late May, but Jeff Garzik, the main developer attached to the New York Agreement, adopted the proposal and planned to release the software client resulting from that agreement weeks before August 1. It was doable.
The Activation
Informational website XBT.eu at the time of BIP91 lock-in
By mid-July, Bitcoin miners had missed their window to activate SegWit through the method proposed by the Bitcoin Core development team in time to be compatible with BIP148. As a result, markets seemed to get nervous about a potential “split” between a BIP148 chain and a non-BIP148 chain. In the span of only a week, bitcoin’s exchange rate tumbled from around $2500 to $1900: the lowest it had been in well over a month.
Possibly startled by these market movements, Bitcoin’s mining community started to rapidly signal support for BIP91, even ahead of the schedule set forth by the New York Agreement. And on July 20, ten days before BIP148’s August 1 flag day for activation, BIP91 locked in. It activated a little over two days later.
With BIP91 locked in, it was only a matter of time before Segregated Witness itself would lock in. This ultimately happened on August 9 — the point of no return having been reached on August 8.
Bitcoin would “officially” get SegWit after another two-week grace period.
The Adoption
Segregated Witness logo designed by Albert Dros
The final step for Segregated Witness is, of course, actual user adoption. Since SegWit has only just activated at the time of publication of this article, it’s impossible to know how quickly and how much the upgrade will actually be used. Some critics, perhaps most notably Garzik, predict that widespread adoption could take up to a year or even longer. Others, including a number of wallet and library developers, think they can utilize the feature within weeks, or they are prepared already. And other technologies that depend on the upgrade, such as the Lightning Network, but also Merkelized Abstract Syntax Trees (MAST), atomic swaps, faster transaction signing for hardware wallets, the more efficient Schnorr signature algorithm, and TumbleBit in payment processor mode, are in various stages of development as well.
It’s been a long road, but anyone who wants to use Segregated Witness should now be able to do so, starting today.
er
五月 18, 2010 at 9:57 上午
关于十一世班禅大师的转世现在是一个罗生门的故事。
我刚刚看完阿嘉活佛的回忆录,随便说一说他在书里的说法。他讲让恰扎活佛和达赖喇嘛通讯,让达赖喇嘛也参与到十一世班禅灵童的选择中,这个是共产党同意的。恰扎活佛和达赖喇嘛通讯以后,由于从达兰萨拉到扎寺的通讯不方便,达赖喇嘛结果没有收到扎寺这边进一步的消息,就自己宣布了。共产党听到这个消息以后,当场就勃然大怒。阿嘉活佛还说到,恰扎活佛不太希望新的班禅大师再从青海这边选,而希望在扎寺所在的西藏自治区里面选择。所以虽然阿嘉活佛在灵童的选择里面担任职务,但是基本上不参与这个活动。
阿嘉活佛还谈到十世班禅结婚的问题,他说某位原国民党的高层人士对班禅大师说,通过结婚可以向党表明自己已经被“改造”成功,完全接受党的领导,从而能为自己民族做点事情。于是班禅大师动了念头,然后这位人士和董其武是麻将友,董听到这个消息,结果打算把自己家的大女儿,年纪大一些嫁给班禅大师。结果,他的小女儿李洁当时很好奇,结果也跟着去了。结果班禅大师对李洁很有好感。结果是有心栽花花不开,无心插柳柳成荫。当然,青海这边,班禅大师的老师对此是很反对的,结果他就派了阿嘉活佛带了信到北京,表示反对这个事情。但是,没有作用。说是报上去,很快就批了。但是,后来共产党认识到这在政治上是个严重错误。于是班禅大师的妻子从不和班禅大师在公众场合出现。
阿嘉活佛还回忆到当年西藏第一次骚乱,开枪以后,共产党请出班禅大师,然后组了好几个工作组。一开始,放到录像是被裁减过的,于是班禅大师勃然大怒,夜里跑到西藏自治区书记伍精华家里,让他交出录像带的全部。班禅大师的想法是基本上是想把它控制在人民内部矛盾来解决,但是最后根本无法控制住。
阿嘉活佛的这本回忆录基本上感觉写得还是比较真实的,可以和平措汪杰等人的回忆录对照着看,基本上说,共产党在藏区搞的东西,和在内地搞的是差不多的,就是破除旧的一切,企图建立一个新的世界。除了内地派来的干部外,内部主要起作用的就是所谓的积极分子了。当然,他也有为尊者讳的习惯,基本上避而不谈当年九世班禅大师在青海流浪的原因。
这里,我纯属凭记忆写几点比较感兴趣的东西,可能有错。大家有机会自己找来看看吧!
davidpeng
五月 18, 2010 at 10:23 上午
这本书值得推荐吗?如果不是战斗材料的话,我去弄一本。
不过这本书的英文题目是《Surviving the Dragon》,封面上似乎是十一世藏班禅的照片,我有些concerns。
丁一夫
五月 19, 2010 at 12:05 上午
那是阿嘉仁波切的照片。
davidpeng
五月 19, 2010 at 8:39 上午
@丁一夫,谢谢指教!
davidpeng
五月 18, 2010 at 11:25 上午
分析一下,在恰扎和达赖喇嘛讨论十一世班禅问题上,阿沛的说法是,“这件事是达赖和恰扎私下里做的,恰扎要求达赖这样做,达赖也特别愿意这么干。”根据Goldstein在雪狮与龙一文中的说法,“恰扎活佛给达赖喇嘛一封信,信中列出了25名候选灵童的详细资料(包括照片)。他还告知达赖喇嘛,种种迹象表明,其中一名男童——根敦确吉尼玛(Gendun Choekyi Nyima)——是真的转世。[7]……1995年初,达赖喇嘛还是检查了这些资料,同意恰扎活佛的结论。2月初,达赖喇嘛给恰扎活佛回信,说他的占卜结果也确认了根敦确吉尼玛。”
这两种说法是一致的,这一点从阿嘉对在青海还是西藏寻找转世的评论得到印证,说明恰扎意图主导整个寻访过程;他同时想利用达赖喇嘛,认定他确认的灵童。但是,Goldstein的来源[7],实际上来自新华社(FBIS—CHI-95-229, 1995年11月29日,新华社)。所以,也不奇怪这两种说法是一致的。在美国方便的朋友可以去查一下FBIS的这个来源,应该也能够找到新华社的中文原稿。这种说法,似乎说明,中国政府知道恰扎和达赖喇嘛通信的所有内容,要么是通过技术手段,要么是其通信本来就存档,要么是事件发生后对恰扎的讯问。
而从阿嘉活佛的回忆看,他虽然在小组中担任职务,但由于种种原因,并不从事其中的具体工作,不知道内情。从他的解释看,这并非他自己的第一手资料,而是转述达赖喇嘛一方对“为什么达赖喇嘛单方面宣布灵童”的解释。因为在事情发生时,他并不在达兰萨拉,他不知道“达赖喇嘛没有收到扎寺这边进一步的消息。”他知道这一解释,要么是事后,(他还在中国境内的时候),由他和达赖喇嘛之间的管道告诉他的;要么是他到海外后,由达赖喇嘛一方的人告诉他的。所以,这个转述的价值并不大。
但是,如果这一解释属实,即达赖喇嘛发布灵童,只是因为通讯不畅。那么Goldstein对此事的猜测不对(当然,苛求猜测似乎没意思)。Goldstein猜测,当中国内部讨论是否放弃金瓶掣签(内部消息中阿沛力图劝说中国政府放弃掣签的努力)遇到僵局时,恰扎做了进一步的事情,他将这一僵局告诉达赖喇嘛一方;受此推动,达赖喇嘛首发了恰扎的认定。
从各种情况和迹象考虑,达赖喇嘛对这个寻访过程并不积极,但是他也愿意配合。这符合达赖系统和班禅系统彼时的关系。但是从这种态度变到积极首发,我觉得应该存在某种推动力,而不是简单的“通讯不畅”。
从阿沛和阿嘉的回忆看,无论出于何种原因,恰扎力图主导整个寻访过程,让所有其他势力为他所用。然而,他面临的矛盾太大,难以调和,“通讯也不畅”,他自己成为了牺牲品,而出现了对参与所有各方都很差的结局。
davidpeng
五月 18, 2010 at 11:46 上午
xiaoxiao以前对我对阿嘉活佛的一些评论有异议。我同意,很多事情可能是永远也弄不清楚的,我们只是在合理猜测和怀疑吧。
我想指出的是,过去在冷战期间,包括其他一些敌对势力之间,这样的出逃很多见;高阶官员的出逃也很常见。这些出逃人员,一般很快变成另外一方的政治宣传工具,有些用来做对方的情报研究的信息来源。你甚至可以认为这是一种反洗脑。
xiaoxiao认为阿嘉活佛的出逃是为了宗教。我看不是。他在海外的活动很多都不是宗教活动,至少是夹杂了很多政治因素的宗教活动。(我倒是认为噶玛巴的出逃有很大程度和宗教有关。)如果说他离开大陆是为了避开大陆政府对宗教的干扰,那他现在处在一个没什么干扰的地方,应该找个寺院好好修炼佛法。
作为政治宣传工具,他很多时候会被有意无意地被植入一些信息。例如上面的关于班禅转世选择的说法。这些话被植入后,通过他的书讲出来,比直接从达赖喇嘛一方讲出来可信度似乎更高。但,仅此而已。
其实就个人观点,我衷心希望阿嘉活佛不是这种情况。因为这种情况对个人而言是悲剧。阿嘉活佛是一名修法多年的高僧,希望他能够破除一切世俗障碍,用平和的心来观照他所经历的这一切。
sol
五月 18, 2010 at 12:26 下午
对此事了解不多,只能旁观各位讨论。
这里讨论一个翻译问题,希望david不要见怪。我觉得你这句话似乎翻译得不大准确。
He reportedly went to government archives to show that the central government had not used the urn before nor had it been involved in the selection of the 10th Panchen.
据报,他查阅政府档案,想证明中央政府在之前的班禅转世中并未使用金瓶,甄选10世班禅时也未使用。
sol
五月 18, 2010 at 12:30 下午
“to show that”我理解为”in order to show that”,即“想证明”
davidpeng
五月 18, 2010 at 12:36 下午
你是对的,我更改了,谢谢!
维基百科中金瓶掣签条说:
仅供参考。不过不想把讨论再分流到关于金瓶掣签上去了。
sol
五月 18, 2010 at 12:52 下午
哎,自己又将那句英文读一遍,发现it可能代指的是the central government,原因有两点:一是从not…nor…的句式结构上看,二是我觉得it后跟了involve这个词,所以主语更像是nor had the central government been involved in…而不是nor had the urn been involved in…
但自己并无百分之百的把握,或许可以请身边有native speaker的朋友帮忙再看看。
如果我是对的,译文就变成了:
据报,他查阅政府档案,想证明中央政府在之前的班禅转世中并未使用金瓶,甄选10世班禅时中央政府也未参与其中。
希望我纠缠在翻译上,不会扰乱大家正题的讨论。
davidpeng
五月 18, 2010 at 1:18 下午
应该这个解释是对的。
er
五月 18, 2010 at 9:19 下午
我觉得还是值得一读的,AMAZON上的评价很高的。但是,我觉得他还是有不少被人加工过的痕迹,有不少为尊者讳的东西,缺少真正的独立的反思。但是,它最少提供了藏族僧侣的视角去看过去的几十年。
davidpeng
五月 18, 2010 at 9:24 下午
我已经找人帮我买了,不知道什么时候才能到我手上来。
谢谢er推荐。
还没看过别人的书,就大放厥词,会被人骂的。呵呵。
er
五月 18, 2010 at 9:25 下午
阿嘉活佛说自己跑掉的原因不是修炼什么佛法,而是怕被卷到十一世班禅的事情上。共产党希望他当班禅的老师,也就是为班禅背书。而他显然不愿意跳到这滩浑水里面去,陷入双方的斗争中,成为一方的筹码,而最后可能象恰扎活佛一样坐牢。于是他觉得三十六计走为上才是对的。
davidpeng
五月 18, 2010 at 9:50 下午
从这个意义上来说,把恰扎抓起来进一步恶化了政府和藏传佛教界的关系。你可以说共产党不好,也可以说达赖喇嘛害了恰扎,反正在当中寻找空间,甚至象恰扎这样试图玩火是越来越难了。
er
五月 18, 2010 at 11:00 下午
几方在那里博弈而已。不知道谁在做最后的决定或者谁在提议,也许是通过占卜,我的理解是打算赌一把,看共产党会不会咽下那口气。如果达赖喇嘛通过幕后先跟共产党协商,承认其在选择班禅灵童有某种权利或者地位的话,未必双方不能有个比较好的结果。就共产党的角度来理解非常简单,我本来全盘控制根本就不让你参与,一点灵童的信息也不告诉你。现在好心好意让你参加,结果你到最后摆了我一道,把我从中彻底抛开。这个脑羞成怒的心态是可见而知的。其实是非常典型的囚徒困境案例。假设双方都是想解决问题的话,那么最重要的就是抛开分歧,先建立一个信息的通道。
丁一夫
五月 19, 2010 at 9:24 下午
对中国政府来说,凡事要紧的是宣示主权。我们却应该理解,对于藏人,对于处于危机感的藏民族精英来说,要紧的是维持其民族传统。因为只有在独特民族传统得以维护的前提下,他们的民族identity才可能维持下去。藏民族的传统以其宗教为核心,而“达赖喇嘛和班禅喇嘛互为师生,互相认证”就是当代他们一定要力争的。
这一点其实不是中央政府和流亡藏人合作的障碍,恰恰是合作的契机,因为逻辑上,达赖喇嘛和班禅喇嘛互相认证,并不妨碍中央政府的主权。中央政府宣示主权,也不一定就不能让达赖喇嘛认证班禅喇嘛。十七世大宝法王噶玛巴的甄选和认证,就是证明。在班禅灵童寻访初期,也有明显合作迹象。
如果中国政府“咽下那口气”,那么,如今在中国政府监护教育下的班禅喇嘛就是全体藏人都应该服膺的“经过达赖喇嘛认可的”班禅喇嘛了。
于是,在如今达赖喇嘛圆寂之后,新的十五世达赖喇嘛,按照传统应该由班禅喇嘛认可。在某种合作下,如果经班禅喇嘛认可的十五世达赖喇嘛产生在境内,那么,达赖喇嘛回归的问题就通过转世解决了。
事情没有如此发展。是好事还是坏事?谁知道呢?对这一问题的后果和影响,达赖喇嘛尊者似乎比较轻松。
我们必须理解,藏民族对于神谕的理解,和我们不一样。我们汉人应该了解他们,能够在他们的地位,用他们的角度来理解他们,才能达到持久的和解。
er
五月 19, 2010 at 11:42 下午
不是理解不理解的问题。我是力图分析当时双方为什么会作出这样或者那样的决策?结局很明显就是一个双输的结局,分析原因可以找出防止这种结局再次发生的可能。
对共产党而言,更重要的是幕后的协商,照顾对方的面子。如果达赖喇嘛把最终宣布的权力让度给中国政府,而他获得参与乃至选择的权力。未必没有可能达成妥协。我觉得关键在于达赖喇嘛过早的宣布这个事情,这在政治上很明显是一个错误。因为我们根本没有看到他背后如何协商,共产党如何不同意等之类的。达赖喇嘛通过共产党同意给的信息,但却没有和共产党协商最终宣布的权力的问题。这就是为什么中国政府会恼怒如此的缘故。
er
五月 19, 2010 at 11:58 下午
在博弈论里面,要逃脱囚徒困境的唯一可能就是双方的信任,相信对方不会出卖自己,然后才能可能取得对双方都最优的结果。
共产党同意恰扎活佛把消息透露给达赖喇嘛,这本身就是一种善意的表现,当然他也希望下一代的班禅没有异议。因为它可以选择完全对达赖喇嘛封锁所有的消息。而对于这种善意,达赖喇嘛没有报以善意,而自己一手把持了宣布的权力,跟本不和共产党协商。共产党也就是忍不下一口气,采取了针锋相对的策略,最后导致了双输的结局。它可以选择忍的策略,这样的话,就是达赖喇嘛全赢,共产党小输。但是,它在气头之下,宁愿选择双方都大输。其实,最后最大的输家还是藏传佛教。
丁一夫
五月 20, 2010 at 12:09 上午
在这个问题上,我原来和你的看法差不多:这事情是双输的结果,政治上是一个错误。
我就此求证过藏人方面。他们的结论却完全不是这样的。
我一开始也觉得很难理解他们的思路。后来发现,你得站在他们的处境上想,还得了解,藏人特别是僧侣,对于“错误”,“后果”,等等的理解和处理方式,是和汉人不一样的。
于是,一切都不再那样地“有所谓”。
er
五月 18, 2010 at 11:10 下午
而且这种达赖喇嘛不参与并非没有先例,当年十世班禅大师就得不到拉萨方面的承认,拉萨方面还找另外一个。后来,随着共产党入藏,十世班禅大师才得到达赖喇嘛系统的正式承认的。当然这个承认表明这个问题的结束,从此再无争议。
比目鱼
五月 19, 2010 at 10:47 下午
丁一夫:
高论。对于很多藏人,将‘甲那’译为内地可尚可受,但未经达赖喇嘛认定,而由共党直接任命的班禅喇嘛藏人是不会接受的。是的,一个民族有他独特的承受底线。北京班禅只能是一厢情愿的政治傀儡,他不可能达到党的期待,只是浪费纳税人的钱的一场闹剧。自编自导自演自看的戏,没有群众基础。
丁一夫
五月 20, 2010 at 12:28 上午
好像记得Goldstein在他的书里说到,中央政府不能给西藏以真正自治的一个原因是,真正的自治是以一定的民主为前提的,如果给西藏以真正自治,就难免在西藏实行一定的民主,那么就没有理由不给中国其他地方以同样的民主。
我的理解是,这也就是说,不给少数民族地区以自治,和不给中国民众以民主,是同一个原因。从根本上说,就是对民众的恐惧。
一定会有人不同意,说不给西藏真正自治是为了防止自治后的西藏要独立。
这种担心也是出于对民众的恐惧。这种恐惧还有一个简单实例:
北京永远也不敢让自己控制之下的班禅行动自由。
er
五月 20, 2010 at 10:10 上午
什么叫真正自治? 我个人觉得这个名词有些问题。其实,所谓自治是一个渐变的名词。我个人觉得应该讲,那些权力如何办?那些权力如何办?而不是,一刀切,说这个是假自治,那个是真自治。
还有民主的问题,其实你要仔细观察的话,我觉得关键还是宪政,而不是民主。所谓宪政也就是统治集团按规矩办,努力照顾社会各阶层的利益,在社会各阶层之间达到平衡。我在加拿大这个国家生活越久,越是觉得人家的政治制度本身就是和许多东西结合在一起,单纯把政治制度给抓出来,然后认为是灵丹妙药,一民主就灵,一自治就灵。我觉得是太幼稚了。
不要把民众放到太高,我觉得对所谓“人民”的吹捧恐怕是共产党对我们愚民教育的一部分而已。我是不太相信所谓的人民的,在中国现阶段,人民大都是愚昧的,容易被煽动的。你也可以把我这种心理所成是对民众的恐惧了。
共产党目前的统治类似一个核反应堆,完全放权给所谓的民主和自治的话,我个人认为爆发民族仇杀的可能性很大。因为对大多数愚民来说,什么是民主,什么是权利,什么是责任,什么是义务,什么是法治,全无概念,心里唯一有概念的就是,所谓非我族类,其心必异。到时候必然沦为,你杀我,我杀你。而共产党又不可能将老百姓教育成公民,而他就必须用武力来控制。所以,只能做一天和尚,撞一天钟了。
路过发一言
五月 20, 2010 at 12:37 上午
er的分析比较有见地。不过就我的猜测,十一世班禅失去影响力的当前现状,未必不是北京和达兰萨拉双方期待的结局,尽管这显然不是藏人的心愿。
就达赖喇嘛或流亡藏人一方来说,不做协商就单方面宣布班禅灵童的选择问题,未必就没有预料到北京后来的暴怒以及对转世灵童带来的影响;但是双方都认可、得到境内外藏人一致尊敬的十一世班禅,如果在共产党的监护下长大,未必对达兰萨拉有利,作为藏民族“双子星”中的一个,多多少少会分流掉一部分达赖喇嘛的影响力,就如同十世班禅所起到的作用。
至于北京,其实也未必期望一个从宗教到政治都具有巨大影响力的十一世班禅,即便灵童由他们选择、也在他们监护下长大,但宗教上师却不可能由一个共产党员来担任,所以很多事情依然是不可控的,未来的十一世班禅究竟会不会象十七世葛马巴那样出走,又有谁能够确定呢?若非如此,共产党政府选择的十一世班禅又怎会长期被羁绊在北京?显然即便是北京选定的十一世班禅,也并没有得到100%的信任。政治花瓶就政治花瓶吧,也许缺乏政治影响力的宗教领袖正是共产党政府所希望的。
可以预计,未来的每一位重要活佛转世,都会是多胞胎,越是混乱就越能够降低转世灵童的影响力;其实就我看来,谁选择并不重要,未必就能够影响活佛未来的倾向性,只要得到藏人的一致认可,即便是象十世班禅大师这样被认为“亲中国”的宗教领袖,依然能够为藏民族做不少事。
比目鱼
五月 20, 2010 at 6:56 上午
各位的帖子都有独特视角,给人以启发。我更加赞同丁一夫的帖子,因为他能从藏人的心理特征和价值观出发,来思考问题。汉人古语:知彼知己,百战不殆。是的,共产党是有权有钱,但仅仅是仗着有权有钱,就任意妄为,其后果堪忧,甚至会和中共的初衷背道而驰。
我认为西藏独立不可行,自治甚至更不可行。假设西藏自治了,汉地各省也开始要人权,要公平,共产党的领导会被急速动摇。
台湾中共没办法搞定,香港和澳门不得不给予高度自治。西藏再自治的话,中共就根本压不住阵脚了。
我在想,假设在香港成立党委,人民政府,配齐人大政协和工青妇,实行四项基本原则,不出两年,香港一定社会大大倒退。我在想,西方白人不是过得好嘛,好,给他们输入中国共产党,实行党的领导,保证整得他们跳。
以上两段只是笑话。解解闷,请各位理解,不要介意。
回到十一世班禅灵童认定。根据我个人对中国政治操作的理解,针对er的帖子,我认为当时共产党即便有权,也根本没办法对达赖喇嘛封锁消息,而全程单方操作灵通认定。因为,寻访灵童是件浩大,细致的工作,由达赖喇嘛主持,加上境内的格鲁派高僧配合,才符合宗教仪轨,没有达赖喇嘛的主持的灵通认定是件极为滑稽之事,做了也没有任何意义。
班禅灵通的认定是个死结。“达赖是人民公敌”是中共一如既往的定性。任命人民公敌提出的人选,不符合共党逻辑,也没法对自己和党外人士交代。对于达赖喇嘛,共党可不是文殊菩萨转世的清朝皇帝,奉藏传佛教为国教,而是侵略西藏,逼迫自己不得不流亡海外的邪恶政权。在这个问题上,双方不可能调和。
比目鱼
五月 20, 2010 at 7:16 上午
路过发一言:
我个人对您帖子的前三段很赞同,只是第四段有不同感受。格鲁派转世灵通认定,本是派内事物,达赖喇嘛具有最终话语权。没有他点头,共党认了也白任。十世班禅大师我还算熟悉。他从文革复出后,强烈的民族主义,民族意识,从政治的角度,其实已经和中共分庭抗礼,渐成尾大不掉之势。我听过他数次讲话,教育西藏班的孩子要穿藏装,吃糌粑,不要忘了自己是藏人等等。我个人认为他在80-90年代的表现,是和中共不一致的。
davidpeng
五月 20, 2010 at 10:07 上午
哈哈,这个问题讨论很激烈。从王力雄收集的中国普通网民对达赖喇嘛的提问中,也可以看到,第1和第4都和这个问题高度相关。
在看过阿沛和阿嘉的回忆之后,我的想法发生了一点变化。在这件事情里面有三个参与方和三个复杂的关系,达赖喇嘛(及他代表的TGIE)和中国政府,班禅大师系统与中国政府,达赖喇嘛系统和班禅大师系统。上面的网友们谈到了第一个,而比目鱼谈到了第二个,即中国政府也力图在这一过程中,利用喇嘛转世制度的天然缺陷,增加对班禅系统的影响力。其实达赖喇嘛世系和班禅大师世系在近代史,直至今日,既合作又存在龃龉,这种关系在这段历史中也扮演了重要角色。
基本的脉络是,班禅系统的僧人主导整个寻访过程,然后寻求其他有影响势力的认可。对于班禅系统来说,这种认可来自同属格鲁派的另一崇高和更高的达赖系统,也来自佛教圈之外的(中国)政府政治势力的认可。而清朝于18世纪末引入的“金瓶掣签”制度,巧妙地将这二者合二为一,一个公开的掣签制度,只需要达赖系统和政治代表(在清朝时驻藏大臣)在场,即可同时获得两方面的认可。而这个制度不符合现代宗教政治制度遴选领导人的思想,但是却极度契合藏人关于“神谕”的想法。(在此之前,如果对灵童发生争执,活佛是通过不那么公开的糌粑丸打卦来确定的。)“神”一定能够在掣签中发挥作用,选择真正的转世。这种制度的效果是如此之好(他提供了一个争端解决机制,如果没有异议,可能不用掣签;但只要有影响力的活佛提出异议,那就掣签解决),在达赖系统转世上可以看得非常清楚。从此之后,西藏贵族和藏传佛教高层不再纠结于谁当达赖喇嘛,选出一些没有显赫出身的达赖喇嘛,而将精力转移到控制达赖喇嘛本人,而达赖喇嘛就可怜地变为短寿龙。(与之对比,多位班禅大师均长寿)而在这个制度中,中国政府并非天然地一定扮演政治角色,关键在于谁扮演这个手握“金瓶”的政治角色。不奇怪,在9世班禅转世的争议中,拉萨政府手握“金瓶”,要求班禅系统将他们选择的青海灵童送往拉萨,和其他灵童一起参与“金瓶掣签”。你也可以想象,如果1959年,TGIE将金瓶也带到印度。
细致地分析阿沛的回忆以及其他一切资料,你会看到,阿沛的建议是,“让达赖喇嘛也选择一个候选灵童,然后让这个候选灵童与其他灵童一起参与掣签。”这个建议和后来的发展不同。我不知道这个建议被恰扎和其代表的班禅系统否决,还是被达赖喇嘛否决。如果是前者,说明班禅系统对达赖喇嘛系统还有疑虑,他想让达赖喇嘛在这个里面扮演角色,但是也不想让达赖喇嘛扮演过多的角色;而如果是后者,说明达赖喇嘛不想参与太多班禅系统的事,或者是觉得这个建议矮化了他的角色。无论如何,这个事情在恰扎那儿,变成了“恰扎编列了灵童列表,他选定了灵童,他要求达赖喇嘛确认”(同时他也力图要求中国政府确认,无需金瓶掣签?)看到了,这是班禅系统希望的灵童选择过程。这个时候,如果有人用我上面说的话去游说中国政府,我认为是有可能避免金瓶掣签的。即“这个制度只是争端解决,在候选灵童无疑议的情况下无需使用,历史上既是如此。”中央政府如果要表达权威,只需要发文认可,同样可以达到目的。“金瓶掣签”反而是多此一举。当然,这种事情没有发生,据说中国政府仍然坚持“金瓶掣签”。
这个事情真正的破局发生在达赖喇嘛的“首发”。Goldstein在文中对此表示极度不解。我也同样。阿嘉没有从达赖喇嘛系统得到更多的解释,只有这个牵强的“通讯不畅”。用这样的解释,说明达赖喇嘛那边的确发生了一些事情,但是不便公开,只能用某种理由搪塞。
十六世噶玛巴转世也曾遇到类似情况。在噶玛巴转世中,同样存在这三个关系。而这中间基本脉络同样是,“噶玛巴系统内部寻找转世,然后寻求外部势力认可”。与班禅转世的结局不同,主导噶玛巴(邬金钦列多杰)转世的大司徒活佛和杰曹活佛妥善游弋于达赖喇嘛和中国政府之间,获得双方认可。我找不到具体资料,不知道他们是怎么干的,达赖喇嘛和中国政府谁先谁后,怎样保证双方都有面子。值得一提的是,因为历史上的噶玛巴转世并未要求达赖喇嘛和政治政府介入(当然也从来没用过金瓶),噶玛巴转世是由上一代喇嘛的遗嘱确定的,所以这种“认可”对于达赖喇嘛和中国政府来说,都是“增加了权威”,所以他们才如此合作。但是,达赖喇嘛和十六世噶玛巴的一些不和却影响了这次转世,出现了双胞案。当然,那是另外的故事了。
davidpeng
五月 20, 2010 at 11:03 上午
新华社网站上有本《十一世班禅坐床记》,没看到啥有价值的内容,这也不是Goldstein的信息来源。
唯一有点意思的是,在达赖喇嘛宣布他选择的班禅之前,嘉乐顿珠电话通知国内,可能就包括阿沛。
sol
五月 20, 2010 at 11:44 上午
各位讨论颇为精彩,受教了。
david 摘录的这段信息有意思,我是第一次听说达赖喇嘛一方提前通知北京即将宣布灵童一事(虽然不是提前很长时间)。不知北京得知此事后,有没有在这么短的时间内尝试与达赖喇嘛一方再沟通?达赖喇嘛一方既然选择提前通知,为什么又只给对方留这么短的反应时间?
另外,作为此帖的读者,我说个回帖的技术问题(不好意思,偏题了,又不知放哪儿好)。我发现有的回帖是直接在别人的帖字下回复,有的是顺延作答。作为写帖人,应该不会觉得confused。作为读者,我个人prefer顺延作答,这样每次有更新,下看就是。
还有,如果每个发言有个编号就好了,这样人多时候,回帖更明晰些,读者看得也方便。
大家继续。
davidpeng
五月 20, 2010 at 12:16 下午
此外,讨论班禅选择问题包括其他一些问题的时候,需要注意,从现代政治意义上来说,藏民族,藏区,旧拉萨政府,藏传佛教是个相当松散的统治模式。如果你从现代政治着手,认为清朝和西藏,民国和康区的隶属关系相当薄弱,那实际上的拉萨和各藏区地方的关系同样或者更加薄弱。在宗教上,如果涉及到不同教派,或者同一教派的不同世系,这种隔离和自治是很明显的。
所以,比目鱼说的“由达赖喇嘛主持班禅选择”是个假议题。这种情况,在达赖系统和班禅系统关系良好的情况下,可能双方会互相介入得多一些,但是很多也只是名义性的,具体的寻访事务是由各自系统的人来主持的;而在双方关系不好的时候,更是无从置喙,九世班禅的转世就是个很明显的例子。
事实上,流亡藏人的这种历史和现实诠释,包括现在这种“大藏区”的团结局面,在很大程度上是在“中国共产党政府”这个强大外力的作用下形成的。回到民国时候,外力压迫较弱,内部各教派,以及拉萨政府辖区外的藏区对于格鲁派和拉萨政府是非常警觉的。他们认为,外来的汉人和政府无论如何,只能在表面上统治,是无法威胁到他们在本地的利益的;而拉萨政府同文同种,他们对当地的威胁是实实在在的。
我知道有藏族人会批评说这是玩统战或者分而治之的一套,我非政府,无意如此,只不过是指出研究者讨论者需要注意的情况。
davidpeng
五月 20, 2010 at 12:16 下午
@sol,我以前用的别的wordpress的theme,好像评论是有序号的,我再找找试试看。
davidpeng
五月 20, 2010 at 12:37 下午
我更换了一个theme,不如以前那个看着素净,但是有评论序号了。
如果各位有意见建议的请发言。
丁一夫
五月 20, 2010 at 8:40 下午
“这段破局,却给后面的十六世噶玛巴转世带来了好处。在噶玛巴转世中,同样存在这三个关系。而这中间基本脉络同样是,“噶玛巴系统内部寻找转世,然后寻求外部势力认可。”由于班禅转世的教训,主导噶玛巴(邬金钦列多杰)转世的大司徒活佛和杰曹活佛得以妥善游弋于达赖喇嘛和中国政府之间,获得双方认可。”
看得我糊涂了。
davidpeng
五月 20, 2010 at 8:45 下午
你说得对,我把时间先后关系弄错了。这段已经修改,多谢指教。
stratus007
五月 21, 2010 at 11:43 下午
“这段破局,却给后面的十六世噶玛巴转世带来了好处。在噶玛巴转世中,同样存在这三个关系。而这中间基本脉络同样是,“噶玛巴系统内部寻找转世,然后寻求外部势力认可。”由于班禅转世的教训,主导噶玛巴(邬金钦列多杰)转世的大司徒活佛和杰曹活佛得以妥善游弋于达赖喇嘛和中国政府之间,获得双方认可。”
看得我糊涂了。
*******************
这里是david笔误,应该指十七世吧.
我好奇的是,当时大司徒回国多方活动是中共允许的,但是十七世大宝坐床后,又不允许他回藏传法导致最终大宝出走,不知道中共又是怎么想的?(是否也与班禅灵童事件被达赖喇嘛方面抢先公布有关?).话题有点扯远了.
stratus007
五月 22, 2010 at 12:27 上午
各位关于十一世班禅失去影响力是达兰萨拉和北京双方的愿望真令我耳目一新。
玉树地震时我还在批评中共完全没有危机公关意识。我比较过几方的反应:
1.达赖喇嘛和大宝法王在4.14地震当天就发表了声明哀悼并表示将举行法会超度
2.北京班禅迟至4.16日才有声明,当时的CCTV和广播都只提到班禅表示捐款却只字不提超度法会。我在上网找资料是才看到班禅的声明全文最后有要求扎什伦布寺举行超度法会等字眼,明显是中央媒体省略了。
关于他迟到的声明,我们几个朋友聊天时说起,有朋友开玩笑说,估计当时突然地震中南海一片混乱,根本无人想起小班禅,等想起来,他又不敢自己胡乱说话,等草拟的稿子经过层层审批,三天已经是最快的速度了。当时我还批评中共没头脑,如果那时小班禅亲临玉树慰问灾民,无疑会大大增加他在藏地的权威以消除藏人对“汉班禅”的不信任,中共这样的做法难道不也是一种笼络(藏)人心吗?更何况还可以反击外界对中共不允许达赖喇嘛去玉树的指责。
路过发一言
五月 22, 2010 at 2:35 上午
藏人不信任“汉班禅”,会是个问题;但若藏人完全接受认可了“汉班禅”,对北京来说恐怕会有更大的问题。比目鱼用的词“尾大不掉”,可以很好地形容北京的这种尴尬。
毕竟,在没有另外一种强大宗教的情况下,没有人是可以被真正洗脑的,包括那些民族主义的中国年轻人。
davidpeng
五月 22, 2010 at 11:23 上午
@stratus007,
这个其实我也考虑到了。中国政府早就应该让他的11世班禅和嘉木祥活佛到玉树去了,而不仅仅是在西黄寺搞超度。
网上有一封据说“十万藏人”要求达赖喇嘛到灾区慰问灾民的请求,我最早在博讯看到的。刚才查了一下,有两个版本(1, 2,我看到的第2个,这个似乎是在第一个的基础上改的。
第二个版本有个突出的地方是提到了“班禅达赖两位活佛”。所以中国政府完全可能要求达赖喇嘛如果回藏举行法会的话,和“汉班禅”共同举行。而这一点恐怕是达赖喇嘛目前无法接受的。洛迪提到目前达赖喇嘛正在与中国政府讨论在6月1日七七的时候或者在一周年的时候访问玉树,我相信这个问题一定会被提到。1951年的历史似乎又重演了,班禅问题又一次横亘在中国政府和达赖喇嘛之间。我个人觉得,更务实的做法是让达赖喇嘛的使者访问灾区,这个比较容易达到,没有太多问题。
达赖喇嘛在昨天的和王力雄的交流中,用有些距离,而有不失礼貌的方式谈到中国政府认定的班禅十一世,似乎意味着至少尊敬而不否认的态度。不过从中国政府的角度看,甚至承认两个“班禅”都是极度困难的事情。此事将会如何进行,还有待观察。
历史如果能够重演,中国政府能够不那么坚持“金瓶掣签”,甚至中国政府如丁一夫所言,“咽下那口气”,认可达赖喇嘛认定的班禅,我觉得现在的情况都会好的多。可惜,历史永远不能够再来,而我们只能放眼未来了。
stratus007
五月 25, 2010 at 12:40 下午
@David,
历史确实不能重演,或许达兰萨拉也曾经后悔过当初的决定,如果仿效当年认证第十七世噶玛巴的做法等北京宣布后再认证,也不是完全不可操作,毕竟班禅始终是藏人,他受的佛法教育和围绕他的经师都是符合西藏传统的,虽然他不可能如噶玛巴般出走(防范肯定更加严密),但是谁也不会预料将来他是否会如他的前世十世班禅大师那样为藏民利益而奋斗…
考虑玉树的问题,我觉得目前中共绝无可能让尊者的代表访问藏区(网上有人提出最好的人选是他妹妹),他们一定没有忘记尊者代表团第一次访问藏区时受到藏民的轰动程度,这也是为何最近一次代表团访问根本没有去藏区(我没记错吧?).另外中共针对这次喇嘛地震救人的秋后算帐做法更使得访问这一方案不可实现.
色达五明佛学院在地震发生后的第二天(4.15),寺院负责人就带领四十八人的先谴队奔赴灾区,随身携带的钱款高达160多万.随后几天,支援灾区的僧人、物资、资金等源源不断;到4.19日,包括负责去现场超度的僧人已经达五千人,筹集发放的现款逾300多万并详细记录死难者名单和拍摄录像作为记录。中共一定对他们短时间内如此组织有方,调动有度,考虑全面及与藏民之间骨肉相连的密切关系印象深刻,在我们眼里此种行为与关系可能令人深为感动,在中共眼里基本就是威胁(想想他们最初是怎么对法轮功震惊的)。多年来中共的一切行为就是要淡化宗教和民族信仰在藏民心中的地位,未了如今一切努力均为白费,管理地方政府和民族宗教事物的官员一定会加紧防范,怎么可能对尊者代表网开一面呢?
老百姓
五月 25, 2010 at 4:39 上午
看到这些留言我觉得奇怪!不客气说我觉得说十一世班禅不受认可有点自欺欺人!
班禅额尔德尼·确吉杰布在中国很受爱戴!作为一个湖南人我和朋友们都很喜爱班禅额尔德尼·确吉杰布!
在网上查一下就知道啊!
stratus007
五月 25, 2010 at 10:46 上午
@老百姓
您去过藏区吗?如果您去过,一定会注意到在各大大小小的寺庙中,无一例外会有一个空的宝座(如果您问里面的工作人员或僧尼,这是谁的法座,回答必定是达赖喇嘛),另外大部分的寺庙(尤其是格鲁派)里也供奉着第十世班禅大师的法相.藏区满大街卖画像的店里,到处都是各位法王和高僧的法像(除第十四世达赖喇嘛,因不被允许),还包括十世班禅及其妻女,第十七世噶玛巴,甚至毛邓江胡的画像.
然而,寺庙中只有在扎什伦布寺和日喀则的大街上,偶然才能发现一两张北京认可的第十一世班禅大师法相.
另外,您也可以看一下最近达赖喇嘛在回答推友关于对班禅额尔德尼·确吉杰布的看法:
“据我的了解,他是蛮聪明的,在佛法上也很努力,但是民众对他还抱有一种怀疑的态度,我认为这主要得靠自己,能否在佛法讲修上做一个有贡献的人,这是很重要的,这是要靠自己的。”
原文如下:
http://wanglixiong.com/2010/05/17.htm
过路人
五月 25, 2010 at 7:32 下午
在一个片子《西藏一年》当中,中央政府认可的小班禅,去藏区的寺院访问,当地的民众也排队欢迎他,接受他的摸顶赐福。从片子里,没有看出这些藏民是被强迫去的。而且,寺院里的和尚们也挺认可小班禅的,虽然有点政治任务的意味,但也看出他们是真心诚意的准备各种仪仗物品,欢迎十一世班禅。
不知道你们有没有看过这个片子?
er
五月 27, 2010 at 8:40 上午
我看过,其实挺简单的,主要看僧侣集团认同否。
各种僧侣集团有自己的考虑,至少不敢与共产党公开作对。
而老百姓嘛,坦率地讲就是跟着走的。
过路人
五月 28, 2010 at 5:10 上午
流亡藏人方面,多承认这个小班禅也是高僧转世,但是多不愿意承认他就是班禅喇嘛。
听到一个流亡藏僧认为他绝对不是真正的班禅转世。依据大致是这样的:因为他受过达赖喇嘛的灌顶,几乎完全听从上师的话,不然他恐怕要犯密乘戒。所以基本上流亡藏僧对小班禅的认同还是跟从达赖喇嘛的。
在国内藏区的寺院,如果寺院活堪布去印度受过达赖喇嘛的灌顶,恐怕也要跟着他走,明显不会在寺院里面挂这个小班禅的法像,比如国内色达地区某著名的宁玛派寺院,去过人的说看不到这个小班禅的法像。原因可能是他们的活佛早年去过印度受灌顶。
藏区精进严肃的修行人,传统上对灌顶要受的密乘戒,守护是很严格的。在任何事情上,也绝不会和金刚上师唱反调。
王老板
三月 9, 2014 at 6:11 上午
诸位,根本不了解藏人 , 也不了解现在内地的汉人。。
首先 关于所谓 汉班禅的认同 完全不用担心。 其实 ,认不认同 不是看普通藏人怎么想 而是看拉寺的人怎么想 。 应该现在拉寺的人 都受过汉班禅灌顶了 ,所以 未来 一定是他了。 藏人 其实不是信中国政府 更不是信尊者。。信的是神寓。 谁选的不重要, 有缘 并能一直坐下去 。 就能接受 。 再等十年 能看到效果。
而 内地政务 看似无能,, 可很多事回过头来看看, 颇有点 大智若愚的味道。 大巧似拙 。玉树未必 就是无心之失。 也许 就是存心不想 国难时刻 任何人能 捞取政治资本。
再怎么称谓 汉尊者 其实 那神王 也是MADE IN 西藏
从远在印度神王那边来说。 提前宣布 这个结果。 其实 最简单了, 就是刻意的。 一石三鸟 何乐而不为 。。 不过人家 不会傻到 上面某位朋友说的 借此试探中共反应的想法。 相反 神王这方是可以料定中共一定会不予承认,另寻高人的 。。。所以 他们选择了 提前通知 但是却不给反应时间的原因。
为什么?? 今天很累 明天带大家 说说。。
lisa
五月 13, 2017 at 5:00 上午
对您的高见很感兴趣,请继续说啊
班禅已经成功举办了时轮金刚灌顶了,意义不言自明,未来已经是十一世班禅的了